QUANTA
QUANTA is an authenticated post-quantum cryptographic protocol and telemetry platform designed to insulate data transmission against Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later quantum adversaries using NIST FIPS 203 ML-KEM and FIPS 204 ML-DSA lattice cryptography.
Project Overview
QUANTA is an authenticated post-quantum cryptographic protocol and telemetry platform designed to insulate data transmission against Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later quantum adversaries using NIST FIPS 203 ML-KEM and FIPS 204 ML-DSA lattice cryptography.
Problem Statement
Modern public-key cryptographic infrastructure (RSA, ECDH, ECDSA) relies on mathematical problems like integer factorization and discrete logarithms that will be solved in polynomial time by Shor's algorithm on cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). Hostile entities are actively executing 'Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later' (HNDL) campaigns, intercepting and storing encrypted network sessions today to decrypt once quantum computing hardware matures. Existing application architectures lack standardized post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) and authenticated post-quantum digital signatures.
Objectives & Scope
Project Objectives
- 01Implement NIST FIPS 203 ML-KEM-768 for post-quantum key encapsulation and shared secret decapsulation
- 02Implement NIST FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 for mutual handshake authentication and MITM protection
- 03Design hybrid key derivation combining classical entropy with lattice-based shared secrets
- 04Enforce AEAD payload protection with AES-256-GCM and cryptographic replay defenses
- 05Provide real-time dashboard telemetry monitoring key generation, encapsulation, and handshake timings
Scope & Boundary
End-to-end cryptographic protocol implementation, session key agreement negotiation, authenticated payload encapsulation, and telemetry measurement. Formal hardware side-channel analysis (timing/power analysis) and HSM deployment are currently out of scope.
Threat Model & Requirements
Threat Model: Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL). Adversary capability: Global passive adversary capable of storing indefinitely all wireline network traffic, with anticipated future access to a fault-tolerant quantum computer running Shor's algorithm. Active adversary: Capable of modifying, dropping, or replaying handshake frames. Security objectives: Confidentiality against quantum cryptanalysis; integrity and authenticity against active MITM; forward secrecy per session.
Architecture
QUANTA operates across three layered cryptographic stages: (1) Authentication Phase where peers verify identities using ML-DSA-65 signatures, (2) Encapsulation Phase where ML-KEM-768 generates a shared seed combined via HKDF-SHA256 into symmetric session keys, and (3) Data Transport Phase where all payloads are encapsulated with AES-256-GCM authenticated ciphertext and monotonically incrementing nonces.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | QUANTA PROTOCOL LAYER | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | +-----------------------+ +---------------------+ | | | Alice (Initiator) | | Bob (Responder) | | | +-----------------------+ +---------------------+ | | | | | | | 1. ClientHello + Ephemeral pk_kem | | | |----------------------------------->| | | | | Generate ss | | | 2. ServerHello + ct_kem | Encapsulate | | | + Sig_dsa(pk_kem || ct_kem) | Sign (FIPS204) | |<-----------------------------------| | | Verify sig | | | | Decapsulate | | | | | 3. Symmetric Key Derivation | | | | K_session = HKDF(ss, salt) | | | |====================================| | | | | | | | 4. AES-256-GCM AEAD Secure Stream | | | |<==================================>| | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
QUANTA Architecture Decomposition
Authenticated post-quantum cryptographic protocol and real-time telemetry platform implementing NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM-768) and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA-65) to protect against Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later quantum adversaries.
QUANTA Protocol
Key Encapsulation
ML-KEM-768
Number Theoretic Transform
Digital Authentication
ML-DSA-65
SHAKE-256 XOF
Key Derivation
HKDF-SHA256
Hybrid Entropy Mixer
Payload Transport
AES-256-GCM
Strict Nonce Manager
Cryptographic Telemetry
Cycle & Latency Profiler
Wireline Footprint Monitor
Java Telemetry UI
Implementation
Implemented a comprehensive post-quantum cryptographic protocol following NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM-768) and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA-65) lattice standards. Built an authenticated key exchange protocol combining quantum-resilient key encapsulation with classical defense-in-depth via HKDF-SHA256 hybrid key derivation. The derived symmetrical session keys feed AES-256-GCM AEAD encryption engines for tamper-resistant data transit. Accompanying the protocol is a real-time cryptographic telemetry dashboard for tracking encapsulation cycle latency, public key footprint overheads, and handshake verification metrics.
Technologies & Rationale
Selected as the primary NIST standard for general key encapsulation. Based on the hard Module Learning with Errors (M-LWE) lattice problem, providing NIST Security Category 3 (equivalent to AES-192 in brute-force resistance) with 1,184-byte public keys.
NIST digital signature standard offering Category 3 lattice-based authentication to prevent active man-in-the-middle (MITM) impersonation during the key exchange handshake.
Provides authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD). 256-bit symmetric keys retain 128 bits of security under Grover's quantum search algorithm, ensuring quantum immunity for symmetric transport.
Extract-and-expand key derivation conforming to RFC 5869, ensuring cryptographic independence and uniform entropy distribution for session key generation.
Testing Methodology
Tested against NIST reference Known-Answer Test (KAT) vectors for ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 to ensure mathematical compatibility with FIPS specifications. Key agreement verified across 10,000 automated test sessions simulating variable network latency and packet corruption. Validated AEAD authentication tag rejection on bit-flip tampered ciphertext.
Results & Evidence
Successfully achieves NIST Security Category 3 post-quantum protection. Mean ML-KEM-768 encapsulation/decapsulation completed within expected CPU budgets. Handshake resists active frame tampering through signature rejection. Telemetry dashboard accurately graphs throughput and memory footprints across sustained sessions.
Limitations & Trade-offs
Lattice-based public keys (1,184 bytes) and ciphertexts (1,088 bytes) impose higher bandwidth overhead compared to classical Curve25519 (32 bytes). Constant-time execution has not been verified on specialized hardware platforms. Dashboard is an engineering instrument, not a distributed enterprise gateway.
Future Improvements
Formal side-channel resistance validation on embedded architectures. Integration with TLS 1.3 hybrid post-quantum cipher suites (X25519+ML-KEM-768 draft). Migration to C-level native acceleration via liboqs.
Resources & Code
Repository URL: https://github.com/prajwalk-cyber/QUANTA